INFORMATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN DUOPOLISTIC FIRMS

被引:4
作者
OKADA, A [1 ]
机构
[1] TOKYO INST TECHNOL,DEPT SYST SCI,MEGURO KU,TOKYO 152,JAPAN
关键词
D O I
10.15807/jorsj.25.58
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:58 / 76
页数:19
相关论文
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