CORPORATE-CONTROL AND BANK EFFICIENCY

被引：217

作者：

PI, L

TIMME, SG

机构：

[1] GEORGIA STATE UNIV,DEPT FINANCE,UNIV PLAZA,ATLANTA,GA 30303

[2] CALIF STATE UNIV HAYWARD,HAYWARD,CA 94542

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 1993年 / 17卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0378-4266(93)90050-N

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

When the CEO is also chairman of the board, principal-agent conflicts may be exacerbated because of the consolidation of the decision management and the decision control processes. Our results suggest that cost efficiency and return on assets are (1) lower for Chairman-CEO banks, (2) positively (negatively or not) related to Nonchairman-CEO (Chairman-CEO) ownership, and (3) unrelated to institutional and large blockholders ownership, and the proportion of inside (outside) directors. These results suggest top management team structure affects performance and internal monitoring devices may not be as effective as envisioned in the literature.

引用

页码：515 / 530

页数：16

共 30 条

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BAUER P, 1993, MEASUREMENT PRODUCTI

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