GROUP SEGREGATION AND OPTIMAL JURISDICTIONS

[1] Buchanan J., 1968, DEMAND SUPPLY PUBLIC

[2] AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF CLUBS [J]. ECONOMICA, 1965, 32 (125) : 1 - 14

[3] Chamberlin E, 1960, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[4] ELLICKSON B, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P334

[5] PRIVATE GOOD CLUBS AND PUBLIC GOOD CLUBS - ECONOMIC MODELS OF GROUP FORMATION [J]. SWEDISH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1972, 74 (01): : 84 - 99

[6] MCGUIRE M, 1969, REV ECON STATIS, V60, P31

[7] OPTIMALITY, PUBLIC GOODS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS - GENERAL THEORETICAL ANALYSIS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1970, 78 (03) : 572 - 585

[8] PAULY MV, 1970, PUBLIC CHOICE, V6, P53

[9] ROTHENBERG J, 1970, ANALYSIS PUBLIC OUTP

[10] SCHELLING TC, 1969, 6014RC RM RAND CORP

[1] Buchanan J., 1968, DEMAND SUPPLY PUBLIC

[2] AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF CLUBS [J]. ECONOMICA, 1965, 32 (125) : 1 - 14

[3] Chamberlin E, 1960, THEORY MONOPOLISTIC

[4] ELLICKSON B, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P334

[5] PRIVATE GOOD CLUBS AND PUBLIC GOOD CLUBS - ECONOMIC MODELS OF GROUP FORMATION [J]. SWEDISH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1972, 74 (01): : 84 - 99

[6] MCGUIRE M, 1969, REV ECON STATIS, V60, P31

[7] OPTIMALITY, PUBLIC GOODS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS - GENERAL THEORETICAL ANALYSIS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1970, 78 (03) : 572 - 585

[8] PAULY MV, 1970, PUBLIC CHOICE, V6, P53

[9] ROTHENBERG J, 1970, ANALYSIS PUBLIC OUTP

[10] SCHELLING TC, 1969, 6014RC RM RAND CORP