ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND THE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS

被引:84
作者
ROGERSON, WP
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.8.4.65
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 90
页数:26
相关论文
共 69 条
[1]  
ALEXANDER A, 1973, WEAPONS ACQUISITION
[2]  
ALEXANDER A, 1989, DEFENSE DEP SUPPORT
[3]   MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT - A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE [J].
ANTON, JJ ;
YAO, DA .
JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, 1990, 9 (01) :60-79
[4]  
ARCHIBALD K, 1981, R2076DRE RAND CORP
[5]  
BARON DP, 1993, INCENTIVES PROCUREME, P7
[6]  
BODILLY S, 1991, R3990DRE RAND CORP
[7]   WHEN MORE IS LESS - DEFENSE PROFIT POLICY IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT [J].
BOWER, AG ;
OSBAND, K .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1991, 22 (01) :107-119
[8]  
*C BUDG OFF, 1987, EFF WEAP PROC STRETC
[9]  
CARTER G, 1974, R1604PR RAND CORP
[10]   THE EFFICIENCY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS OF AIR-FORCE ENGINE PROCUREMENT [J].
CROCKER, KJ ;
REYNOLDS, KJ .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1993, 24 (01) :126-146