ELECTORAL STRATEGY UNDER OPEN-LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

Theory: This paper develops a theory of candidate strategy from social-choice principles and from the workings of open-list proportional representation. The theory is used to explain the campaign behavior and the spatial patterns of vote distribution for candidates to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Hypotheses: Campaign strategy is evaluated with models that predict where deputies will offer budget amendments to benefit target municipalities whose votes they seek in subsequent elections. The choice of target municipalities is a function of the cost of erecting barriers to entry, the dominance of the deputy in the municipality, the spatial concentration of the deputy's statewide vote, the vulnerability of the municipality to invasion by outsiders, the weakness of the deputy in the last election, and the deputy's prior political career. Methods: Logistic regression of amendments to the Brazilian national budget in 1989 and 1990 and OLS regression of municipal-level electoral results for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in the 1990 elections. Results: Deputies seek secure bailiwicks, search for vulnerable municipalities, and strive to overcome their own electoral weakness by delivering pork. Candidates' tactics vary, partly because political backgrounds differ and partly because the differing demographic and economic contexts of Brazilian states reward some tactics and penalize others. Candidate behavior hinders voter control over deputies, increases incentives for pork seeking, and weakens party programs and discipline.