THE COSTS OF INEFFICIENT BARGAINING AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS - EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATE LAWSUITS

被引:123
作者
BHAGAT, S
BRICKLEY, JA
COLES, JL
机构
[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,WILLIAM E SIMON SCH BUSINESS ADM,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
[2] UNIV COLORADO,BOULDER,CO 80309
[3] UNIV UTAH,SALT LAKE CITY,UT 84112
关键词
LAWSUITS; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; BARGAINING;
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(94)90005-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study provides the first large-sample analysis of the stock-market reactions to interfirm litigation. When a suit is filed, the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1%, while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains. For the average pair of firms, the combined drop in value upon filing is $21 million. Much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled. The findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes. Part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 247
页数:27
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