THE RELATIVE PROFITABILITY OF NASH BARGAINING ON THE LABOR DEMAND CURVE OR THE CONTRACT CURVE

被引:26
作者
DOWRICK, S
机构
[1] Australian National University, Canberra
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(90)90156-U
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Given the Nash bargaining solution with parametric bargaining strengths and threat points, it is shown that profits are often higher if the bargaining agenda between a union and a single firm, or two unions and Cournot duopolists, excludes employment. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:121 / 125
页数:5
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