CYCLIC TOURNAMENTS AND COOPERATIVE MAJORITY VOTING - A SOLUTION

被引：62

作者：

SCHWARTZ, T

机构：

[1] Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, 90024-1472, CA

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 1990年 / 7卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01832917

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A new solution concept is axiomatically characterized for tournaments that represent cooperative majority voting. The predicted set of outcomes lies inside the top-cycle set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.

引用

页码：19 / 29

页数：11

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