ON LIMITING OR ENCOURAGING RIVALRY IN TECHNICAL PROGRESS - THE EFFECT OF PATENT SCOPE DECISIONS

被引:104
作者
MERGES, RP
NELSON, RR
机构
[1] School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027
关键词
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR; MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING; LAW AND ECONOMICS;
D O I
10.1016/0167-2681(94)90083-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This essay is on the effects of the scope of a patent - e.g., how broad its allowed claims - on subsequent inventing in a field. It is argued that this depends on the topography of technical advance in a field, in particular on how inventions are linked to each other, and in the extent to which rapid technical advance requires a diversity of actors and minds, as contrasted with being facilitated by express coordination of inventive activity. Technical advance is examined in several different fields, with a focus on how patents influenced the pace and quality of development. The authors conclude that allowing and enforcing broad patent claims tends to hinder technical progress.
引用
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页码:1 / 24
页数:24
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