BARGAINING WITHOUT CONVEXITY - GENERALIZING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION

被引：15

作者：

ANANT, TCA ^{[1
]}

MUKHERJI, B ^{[1
]}

BASU, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PRINCETON UNIV, PRINCETON, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1990年 / 33卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(90)90155-T

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is shown that Kalai and Smorodinsky's result - that their solution is the only one satisfying certain reasonable axioms - is true even if we generalize the domain of bargaining games to allow for non-convex utility feasibility sets. The paper defines a property called 'Nash equilibrium (henceforth NE) regularity' and shows that the result is true as long as the feasibility sets happen to be NE-regular. © 1990.

引用

页码：115 / 119

页数：5