TRANSFERS IN KIND - WHY THEY CAN BE EFFICIENT AND NONPATERNALISTIC

被引:11
作者
BRUCE, N [1 ]
WALDMAN, M [1 ]
机构
[1] CORNELL UNIV,JOHNSON GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,ITHACA,NY 14853
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
引用
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页码:1345 / 1351
页数:7
相关论文
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