A THEORY OF MONOPOLY PRICING SCHEMES WITH DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

[1] Baron D.P., 1971, INT ECON REV, V12, P196, DOI [10.2307/2525681, DOI 10.2307/2525681]

[2] BARON DP, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P384

[3] BROWN G, 1969, AM ECON REV, V59, P119

[4] CREW MA, 1978, AM ECON REV, V68, P31

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[6] HARRIS M, UNPUBLISHED

[7] COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) : 433 - 445

[8] HOLTHAUSEN DM, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P94

[9] LELAND HE, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P278

[10] PRICING POWER SUPPLIED ON AN INTERRUPTIBLE BASIS [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1974, 5 (03) : 263 - 274

[1] Baron D.P., 1971, INT ECON REV, V12, P196, DOI [10.2307/2525681, DOI 10.2307/2525681]

[2] BARON DP, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P384

[3] BROWN G, 1969, AM ECON REV, V59, P119

[4] CREW MA, 1978, AM ECON REV, V68, P31

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[6] HARRIS M, UNPUBLISHED

[7] COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) : 433 - 445

[8] HOLTHAUSEN DM, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P94

[9] LELAND HE, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P278

[10] PRICING POWER SUPPLIED ON AN INTERRUPTIBLE BASIS [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1974, 5 (03) : 263 - 274