DUAL LABOR-MARKETS, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND SEARCH

被引：21

作者：

ALBRECHT, JW

VROMAN, SB

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 10卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298295

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. We prove existence and investigate the occurrence and nature of dual labor market equilibria.

引用

页码：438 / 461

页数：24

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