LOWER HEMICONTINUITY OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCE

被引：5

作者：

ENGL, G

机构：

[1] Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, Social Science Tower, University of California at Irvine, Irvine

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 9卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1995.1012

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

We study the continuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in games of incomplete information. We show that small changes in beliefs lead neither to drastic changes in behavior nor to strong incentives to alter behavior. We represent players' beliefs by probability measures on a state space and assume beliefs converge setwise. These results are not true under the more usual notion of weak convergence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D80, D82. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：151 / 160

页数：10

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