COVERING, DOMINANCE, AND INSTITUTION-FREE PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL CHOICE

被引:226
作者
MCKELVEY, RD
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2111098
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
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页码:283 / 314
页数:32
相关论文
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