INCENTIVES IN INTERDEPENDENT ESCAPE AS AFFECTING DEGREE OF GROUP INCOORDINATION

Subjects in groups of six were placed in a situation involving: (a) alleged threat; (b) a narrow escape channel allowing only one person at a time to escape. The measures of incoordination during escape were: (1) the amount of time the members of a group obstructed one another in use of the escape channel; (2) percentage of successful escapes in a group. It was found that given the presence of high threat introduction of high incentive to delay escape decreased incoordination. Similarly, with low incentive to delay escape increase in threat enhanced incoordination. The discussion relates the magnitudes of threats for failing to escape and rewards for delaying escape to the probability of escape. In addition it considers some theoretical mechanisms possibly mediating the reduction in incoordination under threat observed with the increase in the incentive to delay escape. © 1969.