THE 1993 ARGENTINE ELECTIONS

With the exception of the Federal District where the two senators are indirectly elected through an electoral college

The four largest districts (Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Córdoba and Santa Fé) with more than half the population of the country elect more than half of the national representatives. The median districts (Corrientes, Chaco, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Juan, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán) elect between six and ten representatives each

the remaining ten smaller districts together elect less than a fifth of the national representatives

Nevertheless, the enlargement produced by the decree is not enough to make PR work effectively in the smaller districts. There, the established minimum of five representatives per district means a district magnitude of two or three seats every two years because of the renewal of the Chamber by halves

There is only one ballot per party which includes executive and legislative candidates. Thus, it is necessary to physically cut the ballot to combine a vote for a presidential candidate of one party and a legislative candidate of another party. This reality enhances presidential coat-tails, by discouraging split-ticket voting (and, relatedly, fractionalization in the legislative level). Despite exceptions, there is a historical tendency towards straight ticket voting (at each electoral level)

In some provinces (mainly in Buenos Aires) Peronism split into two different factions and ran on two different tickets

The three parties won the provincial elections in 1983 and two of them (PAL in Corrientes and MPN in Neuquén) have just won again in 1993

Only one election for governor was held. In the province of Corrientes, the Pacto Autonomista-Liberal won the elections for governor with 46.7 per cent. However, ‘ballotage’ elections should decide the governorship in the absence of a majority. This ‘ballotage’ electoral system replaces the previous electoral college that had produced deadlocks in the 1991 and 1992 gubernatorial elections. These deadlocks were followed by federal intervention

With the exception of the Federal District where the two senators are indirectly elected through an electoral college

The four largest districts (Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Córdoba and Santa Fé) with more than half the population of the country elect more than half of the national representatives. The median districts (Corrientes, Chaco, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Juan, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán) elect between six and ten representatives each

the remaining ten smaller districts together elect less than a fifth of the national representatives

Nevertheless, the enlargement produced by the decree is not enough to make PR work effectively in the smaller districts. There, the established minimum of five representatives per district means a district magnitude of two or three seats every two years because of the renewal of the Chamber by halves

There is only one ballot per party which includes executive and legislative candidates. Thus, it is necessary to physically cut the ballot to combine a vote for a presidential candidate of one party and a legislative candidate of another party. This reality enhances presidential coat-tails, by discouraging split-ticket voting (and, relatedly, fractionalization in the legislative level). Despite exceptions, there is a historical tendency towards straight ticket voting (at each electoral level)

In some provinces (mainly in Buenos Aires) Peronism split into two different factions and ran on two different tickets

The three parties won the provincial elections in 1983 and two of them (PAL in Corrientes and MPN in Neuquén) have just won again in 1993

Only one election for governor was held. In the province of Corrientes, the Pacto Autonomista-Liberal won the elections for governor with 46.7 per cent. However, ‘ballotage’ elections should decide the governorship in the absence of a majority. This ‘ballotage’ electoral system replaces the previous electoral college that had produced deadlocks in the 1991 and 1992 gubernatorial elections. These deadlocks were followed by federal intervention