RENT EXTRACTION AND INTEREST-GROUP ORGANIZATION IN A COASEAN MODEL OF REGULATION

被引：36

作者：

MCCHESNEY, FS

机构：

[1] EMORY UNIV,LAW,ATLANTA,GA 30322

[2] EMORY UNIV,BUSINESS,ATLANTA,GA 30322

来源：

JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES | 1991年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467879

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：73 / 90

页数：18

共 38 条

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