User participation and fishery management performance within the Pacific Fishery Management Council

被引:39
作者
Hanna, SS
机构
[1] Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis
基金
美国海洋和大气管理局;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0964-5691(95)00046-1
中图分类号
P7 [海洋学];
学科分类号
0707 ;
摘要
Fish populations have the potential to contribute to the long-term economic and social benefit of humans, but to no so they must be managed in ways which maintain ecological health. There are many ways that management performance can be assessed, but four measures are particularly pertinent to sustainability: equity, stewardship, regulatory resilience, and efficiency. A key factor in management performance is the process by which management tools are developed and implemented. One approach that has been recommended to improve performance is to structure the management process around user participation. The paper analyzes three case studies of riser participation in ad hoc processes of Pacific groundfish management: the development of a license limitation program; an inter-gear sablefish allocation; and the development of a sablefish individual quota (IQ) program. The case studies illustrate the role played by participation in contributing to the equity, stewardship, resilience, and efficiency of the management process. The effect of user participation was mixed in the three cases, depending on the history of participation, the structure and process of participation, on resource conditions and on tire characteristics of the program under consideration. Participation can contribute positively to fishery management performance when there is a history of collective decision-making, the time line is slow enough to allow a frill consideration of the issues, educational possibilities are pursued and the condition of the resource allows equitable compromises. (C) 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:23 / 44
页数:22
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