THE IMPACT OF DISTRIBUTIVE UNCERTAINTY ON COALITION-FORMATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

This paper examines the tendency of group members to form coalitions when the effects of such behavior are harmful to the larger group. The groups under study must distribute a limited pool of resources among members in a social dilemma situation. If coalitions are formed, the resource is replenished at lower rate than if coalitions are not formed. The incidence and nature of coalition behavior are examined through a cognitive approach to group choice, which draws from equity theory, social dilemmas, and coalition research. The results indicate that groups lacking an established distribution rule are more likely to form coalitions than groups operating under an established distribution rule. Groups in the uncertain condition had significantly lower individual, as well as group, outcomes. Further, groups lacking a distribution rule tended to establish a normative rule; both total group distributions and coalition distributions (when formed) were anchored by available, but not necessarily relevant, information. © 1992.