TRUTHFUL REVELATION IN THE DIAMOND AND DYBVIG BANKING ENVIRONMENT

被引：2

作者：

ALONSO, I ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1993年 / 41卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(93)90158-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The welfare analysis in the Diamond and Dybvig banking literature has been conducted by appealing to the 'revelation principle': the best banking arrangement that induces truthtelling by depositors is characterized, and it is asserted, presumably by appeal to the revelation principle, that no other arrangement could give higher welfare. This appeal to the revelation principle is, however, not straightforward because the Diamond and Dybvig environment includes a sequential service constraint which is not present in standard formulations of the revelation principle. This paper justifies the use of the revelation principle in sequential service environments.

引用

页码：307 / 312

页数：6