GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR GLOBAL INTRANSITIVITIES IN FORMAL VOTING MODELS

[1] Arrow Kenneth J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] Berge C., 1963, TOPOLOGICAL SPACES I

[3] COHEN LF, UNPUBLISHED

[4] SOCIAL PREFERENCE ORDERINGS AND MAJORITY RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1972, 40 (01) : 147 - &

[5] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[6] Farquharson R., 1969, THEORY OF VOTING

[7] CLASS OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR MAJORITY-RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (02) : 285 - 297

[8] KRAMER GH, 1973, J MATH SOCIOL, V2, P165

[9] McKelvey R. D., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P144, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.2.144

[10] MULTISTAGE GAME REPRESENTATION OF SOPHISTICATED VOTING FOR BINARY PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 18 (01) : 1 - 22

[1] Arrow Kenneth J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] Berge C., 1963, TOPOLOGICAL SPACES I

[3] COHEN LF, UNPUBLISHED

[4] SOCIAL PREFERENCE ORDERINGS AND MAJORITY RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1972, 40 (01) : 147 - &

[5] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[6] Farquharson R., 1969, THEORY OF VOTING

[7] CLASS OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR MAJORITY-RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (02) : 285 - 297

[8] KRAMER GH, 1973, J MATH SOCIOL, V2, P165

[9] McKelvey R. D., 1976, Mathematics of Operations Research, V1, P144, DOI 10.1287/moor.1.2.144

[10] MULTISTAGE GAME REPRESENTATION OF SOPHISTICATED VOTING FOR BINARY PROCEDURES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 18 (01) : 1 - 22