OFF-BALANCE SHEET LIABILITIES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REGULATION

被引:32
作者
BOOT, AWA [1 ]
THAKOR, AV [1 ]
机构
[1] INDIANA UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47405
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0378-4266(91)90102-R
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the effect of banks' off-balance sheet activities (particularly loan commitments) on their asset portfolio risk when banks as well as borrowers are free to choose asset risk. We formally establish that banks that have loan commitments have lower asset risk than banks that do not. Loan commitments may thus reduce the bank's portfolio risk and lower the exposure of the federal deposit insurer. We then analyze the implications of the interaction between banks' on- and off-balance sheet activities for the recently adopted BIS capital guidelines, maintaining a clear distinction between loan commitments and other off-balance sheet activities. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:825 / 846
页数:22
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]  
ALFRIEND MC, 1988, EC REV NOV
[2]   Optimal Security Design [J].
Allen, Franklin ;
Gale, Douglas .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1988, 1 (03) :229-263
[3]  
AVERY RB, 1990, UNPUB LOAN COMMITTME
[4]  
BERKOVITCH E, IN PRESS J FINANCIAL
[5]  
BESANKO J, 1990, BANKING DEREGULATION
[6]   COMPETITION, RISK NEUTRALITY AND LOAN COMMITMENTS [J].
BOOT, A ;
THAKOR, AV ;
UDELL, GF .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 1987, 11 (03) :449-471
[7]  
BOOT A, 1991, EC J MAY
[8]   CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS AND BANKS - INTERMEDIATION AS CREDIBILITY ASSURANCE [J].
BOOT, AWA ;
THAKOR, AV ;
UDELL, GF .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 1991, 15 (03) :605-632
[9]  
BOVE RX, 1990, AM BANKER 1228
[10]  
BREWER E, 1986, P C BANK STRUCTURE C, P413