SOCIAL CHOICE SCORING FUNCTIONS

被引：241

作者：

YOUNG, HP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CITY UNIV NEW YORK,GRAD SCH,DEPT MATH,NEW YORK,NY 10036

来源：

SIAM JOURNAL ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS | 1975年 / 28卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1137/0128067

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

When there are only two alternatives to choose from, the method of simple majority rule seems to be the most natural and commonly used social choice function. However, a great variety of rules are used in practice for group decision making when three or more alternatives are involved. The object of this paper is to study two natural conditions on social choice functions, and to describe precisely the family of all functions satisfying these two conditions.

引用

页码：824 / 838

页数：15

共 8 条

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[3] CONDORCET MJA, 1785, ESSAI APPLICATION AN
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[5] May Kenneth O., 1952, ECONOMETRICA, V20, P680
[6] Rockafellar RT., 1970, CONVEX ANAL, DOI [10.1515/9781400873173, DOI 10.1515/9781400873173]
[7] AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES WITH VARIABLE ELECTORATE
SMITH, JH
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (06) : 1027 - 1041
[8] AXIOMATIZATION OF BORDAS RULE
YOUNG, HP
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 9 (01) : 43 - 52

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