POLICY COOPERATION AMONG BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENTS MAY BE UNDESIRABLE

[1] TIME CONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL POLICY IN A MONETARY ECONOMY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1978, 46 (06) : 1411 - 1428

[2] Canzoneri Matthew B., 1988, CARNEGIE ROCHESTER C, V28, P93, DOI DOI 10.1016/0167-2231(88)90021-8

[3] CHARI VV, 1988, IN PRESS MODERN BUSI

[4] CHARI VV, 1986, 317 FED RES BANK MIN

[5] DEVEREUX M, 1986, INT COOPERATION PREC

[6] DEVEREUX M, 1986, INT COORDINATION FIS

[7] DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY, COOPERATION AND THE BENEVOLENT DISSEMBLING GOVERNMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 1980, 2 (01) : 93 - 107

[8] Hamada K, 1976, J POLITICAL EC, V84, P667

[9] COORDINATION OF FISCAL-POLICIES IN A WORLD-ECONOMY [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1987, 19 (03) : 349 - 376

[10] KEHOE PJ, 1986, 103 FED RES BANK MIN

[1] TIME CONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL POLICY IN A MONETARY ECONOMY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1978, 46 (06) : 1411 - 1428

[2] Canzoneri Matthew B., 1988, CARNEGIE ROCHESTER C, V28, P93, DOI DOI 10.1016/0167-2231(88)90021-8

[3] CHARI VV, 1988, IN PRESS MODERN BUSI

[4] CHARI VV, 1986, 317 FED RES BANK MIN

[5] DEVEREUX M, 1986, INT COOPERATION PREC

[6] DEVEREUX M, 1986, INT COORDINATION FIS

[7] DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY, COOPERATION AND THE BENEVOLENT DISSEMBLING GOVERNMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 1980, 2 (01) : 93 - 107

[8] Hamada K, 1976, J POLITICAL EC, V84, P667

[9] COORDINATION OF FISCAL-POLICIES IN A WORLD-ECONOMY [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1987, 19 (03) : 349 - 376

[10] KEHOE PJ, 1986, 103 FED RES BANK MIN