DEREGULATION, STRATEGIC CHOICE, RISK AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

被引：88

作者：

REGER, RK

DUHAIME, IM

STIMPERT, JL

机构：

[1] MEMPHIS STATE UNIV,FOGELMAN COLL BUSINESS & ECON,MEMPHIS,TN 38152

[2] MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,ELI BROAD GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,E LANSING,MI 48824

来源：

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1992年 / 13卷 / 03期

关键词：

DEREGULATION; STRATEGIC CHOICE; RISK; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; COMMERCIAL BANKING;

D O I：

10.1002/smj.4250130303

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study explores the effects of regulation and deregulation on strategic choice and performance in the U.S. banking industry. Drawing on literature from strategic management, industrial organization economics, and organization theory, we develop a framework which suggests that regulatory scope and regulatory incrementalism influence strategic choice and performance. A path analytic model is used to empirically examine these influences. The results suggest that deregulation has direct effects on firms' strategic choices and both direct and indirect effects on risk and return.

引用

页码：189 / 204

页数：16

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