COST OBSERVATION, AUDITING AND LIMITED-LIABILITY

被引：4

作者：

LAWARREE, JP

VANAUDENRODE, MA

机构：

[1] UNIV QUEBEC,DEPT SCI ECON,POB 8888,MONTREAL H3C 3P8,QUEBEC,CANADA

[2] UNIV WASHINGTON,SEATTLE,WA 98195

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 39卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90179-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we consider the effect of limited liability for agents in a principal-agent framework with imperfect auditing. We show that limited liability annihilates the incentive effects of auditing by preventing the principal from giving a negative rent to the bad type agent when an audit mistake occurs: if you cannot convict an innocent, do not audit.

引用

页码：419 / 423

页数：5