REFUSALS TO DEAL, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, AND INDEPENDENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

被引：25

作者：

Chen, Zhiqi ^{[1
]}

Ross, Thomas W. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Carleton Univ, Dept Econ, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada

[2] Univ British Columbia, Fac Commerce & Business Adm, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1993年 / 2卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00593.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to rnonopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper proilides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimrnation: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, furcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.

引用

页码：593 / 614

页数：22

共 13 条

[1] COMMODITY BUNDLING AND BURDEN OF MONOPOLY [J].