PRIORITY SETTING IN HEALTH-CARE - AN AXIOMATIC BARGAINING APPROACH

被引:7
作者
CLARK, D
机构
[1] Department of Economics, NFH, University of Tromsø
关键词
HEALTH CARE BUDGET; DIVISION RULES; BARGAINING;
D O I
10.1016/0167-6296(95)00006-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how axiomatic bargaining theory can be used to analyze different rules for dividing the health care budget between two patients. This approach allows an explicit statement of the assumptions underlying the division rules and also provides a general characterization of the consequences of using these rules when the opportunity set (or number of patients) changes.
引用
收藏
页码:345 / 360
页数:16
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