SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES AND STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM - A RESTAURANT PRICING GAME

被引：34

作者：

KARNI, E ^{[1
]}

LEVIN, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV HOUSTON,HOUSTON,TX 77004

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1994年 / 102卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261956

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using a game-theoretic approach, we examine possible equilibrium explanations of the often-observed phenomenon that two neighboring restaurants offering similar menus nevertheless experience vastly different demands. The essential aspect of this analysis is the presence of a consumption externality that makes the popularity itself a factor in the determination of the relative attractiveness of the restaurants.

引用

页码：822 / 840

页数：19