AGENDA CONTROL, COMMITTEE CAPTURE, AND THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

被引:30
作者
BENDOR, J [1 ]
MOE, TM [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,POLIT SCI,STANFORD,CA 94305
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1960863
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:1187 / 1207
页数:21
相关论文
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