INFORMATION REVELATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS

被引：2

作者：

ALVI, E

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 6卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298178

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

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页码：132 / 146

页数：15

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