Individual and Collective Rationality in a Dynamic Pareto Equilibrium

被引：2

作者：

Haurie, A. ^{[1
]}

Delfour, M. C. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Ecole Hautes Etud Commerciales, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] Univ Montreal, Ctr Rech Math, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 1974年 / 13卷 / 03期

关键词：

Multistage games; multicriteria optimization; minimax problems; n-person games; linear systems;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00934866

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper deals with the problem of establishing the conditions for individual and collective rationality when a set of players cooperate in a Pareto equilibrium. To derive such conditions one follows the approach of the theory of reachability of perturbed systems. Open-loop and closed-loop concepts are discussed and are shown to be nonequivalent.

引用

页码：290 / 302

页数：13