MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE

被引：320

作者：

SHAVELL, S

机构：

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1979年 / 93卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1884469

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I. Introduction, 541-II. The model, 542-III. Moral hazard when care is not observed by the insurer, 544-IV. Moral hazard when care is observed by the insurer, 550-Appendix, 561. © 1979 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

引用

页码：541 / 562

页数：22

共 13 条

[1]

Arrow K., 1971, ESSAYS THEORY RISK B

[2] SINGLE ACTIVITY ACCIDENTS [J].

DIAMOND, PA .

JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) :107-164

[3] MARKET INSURANCE, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SELF-PROTECTION [J].

EHRLICH, I ;

BECKER, GS .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1972, 80 (04) :623-648

[4]

HARRIS M, 1978, OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CO

[5] MORAL HAZARD IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY [J].

HELPMAN, E ;

LAFFONT, JJ .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (01) :8-23

[6]

Mirrlees J., 1975, MORAL HAZARD THEORY

[7]

PAULY MV, 1968, AM ECON REV, V58, P531

[8]

PAULY MV, 1974, Q J EC, V87, P44

[9] RISK SHARING AND INCENTIVES IN THE PRINCIPAL AND AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J].

SHAVELL, S .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :55-73

[10]

Spence A. Michael, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P380

← 1 2 →