WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL-LEARNING

被引:415
作者
ELLISON, G [1 ]
FUDENBERG, D [1 ]
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2118512
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents. We find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices, with less communication making this conformity more likely. Despite the players' naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment, word-of-mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior. These socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others.
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页码:93 / 125
页数:33
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