POLLUTION REGULATION AND INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTION-CONTROL RESEARCH

被引：24

作者：

Biglaiser, Gary ^{[1
]}

Horowitz, John K. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Econ, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA

[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1994年 / 3卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00663.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution-control technologies and to adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental regulations that both control pollution and provide incentives for research. Technology adoption standards are part of the optimal regulation. Another finding is that making the adoption standard stricter reduces research.

引用

页码：663 / 684

页数：22

共 19 条

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