CONCEPTUAL-FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

被引:1614
作者
OUCHI, WG
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.25.9.833
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
It is the objective of this study to describe three fundamentally different mechanisms through which organizations can seek to cope with this problem of evaluation and control. The three will be referred to as markets, bureaucracies, and clans. In a fundamental sense, markets deal with the control problem through their ability to precisely measure and reward individual contributions; bureaucracies rely instead upon a mixture of close evaluation with a socialized acceptance of common objectives; and clans rely upon a relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals. This study explores the organizational manifestations of these three approaches to the problem of control.
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页码:833 / 848
页数:16
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