1ST MOVER DISADVANTAGES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION

被引：105

作者：

GALOR, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TECHNION ISRAEL INST TECHNOL, HAIFA, ISRAEL

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297517

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：279 / 292

页数：14

共 16 条

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[5]

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[6] CAPITAL, COMMITMENT, AND ENTRY EQUILIBRIUM [J].

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[7]

ERICSON WA, 1969, J ROY STAT SOC B, V31, P332

[8] 1ST MOVER AND 2ND MOVER ADVANTAGES [J].

GALOR, E .

[9]

GALOR E, 1985, INCOMPLETE INFORMATI

MILGROM, P ;

ROBERTS, J .