OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN

[1] GRIESMER JH, 1967, NAV RES LOGIST Q, V14, P415

[2] HARRIS M, 1978, ALLOCATION MECHANISM

[3] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[4] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[5] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[6] MASKIN ES, 1980, 87D HARV U KENN SCH

[7] CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (03) : 679 - 688

[8] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[9] Ortega-Reichert A, 1968, 8 STANF U DEP OP RES

[10] Rockafellar R.T., 1970, CONVEX ANAL

[1] GRIESMER JH, 1967, NAV RES LOGIST Q, V14, P415

[2] HARRIS M, 1978, ALLOCATION MECHANISM

[3] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[4] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[5] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[6] MASKIN ES, 1980, 87D HARV U KENN SCH

[7] CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (03) : 679 - 688

[8] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[9] Ortega-Reichert A, 1968, 8 STANF U DEP OP RES

[10] Rockafellar R.T., 1970, CONVEX ANAL