ON ECONOMIC GAMES WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY SUPER-ADDITIVE - SOLUTION CONCEPTS AND APPLICATION TO A LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD PROBLEM WITH FEW AGENTS

被引：25

作者：

GUESNERIE, R

ODDOU, C

机构：

[1] CEPREMAP, GRASCE

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1979年 / 3卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(79)90001-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Core-like solution concepts based on stable coalition structures are studied in the context of games which are not necessarily superadditive. It is shown that a simple economic model involving local public goods financed by wealth taxes has this characteristic. © 1979.

引用

页码：301 / 306

页数：6