ENDOGENOUS FIRM EFFICIENCY IN A COURNOT PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

被引：91

作者：

MARTIN, S

机构：

[1] European University Institute, Florence

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1993年 / 59卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1993.1028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a market of Cournot firms managed by agents, the degree of firm efficiency is inversely related o the number of firms in the market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L22, D23, D43. © 1993 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：445 / 450

页数：6

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