WINDING DOWN IF PREEMPTION OR ESCALATION OCCURS - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

被引：7

作者：

BRAMS, SJ ^{[1
]}

KILGOUR, DM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] WILFRID LAURIER UNIV,DEPT MATH,WATERLOO N2L 3C5,ONTARIO,CANADA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/0022002787031004001

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：547 / 572

页数：26

共 49 条

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[2]

[Anonymous], 1982, GAME THEORY SOCIAL S

[3]

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[4]

Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO

[5]

Blair Bruce G., 1985, STRATEGIC COMMAND CO

[6]

BORAWSKI J, 1986, AVOIDING WAR NUCLEAR

[7]

Bracken Paul J., 1983, COMMAND CONTROL NUCL

[8] OPTIMAL DETERRENCE [J].

BRAMS, SJ ;

KILGOUR, DM .

BRAMS, SJ ;

KILGOUR, DM .

[10] NONMYOPIC EQUILIBRIA IN 2 X 2 GAMES [J].

BRAMS, SJ ;

WITTMAN, D .