ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA - AN APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE COOPERATION

被引：40

作者：

LIMA, SL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ARIZONA, DEPT ECOL & EVOLUT BIOL, TUCSON, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

AMERICAN NATURALIST | 1989年 / 134卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/285015

中图分类号：

Q14 [生态学（生物生态学）];

学科分类号：

071012 ; 0713 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：828 / 834

页数：7

相关论文

共 16 条

[1] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
AXELROD, R
HAMILTON, WD
[J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396
[2] Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[3] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME
BOYD, R
LORBERBAUM, JP
[J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59
[4] EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR BY RECIPROCATION
BROWN, JS
SANDERSON, MJ
MICHOD, RE
[J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1982, 99 (02) : 319 - 339
[5] BEHAVIOR-DEPENDENT CONTEXTS FOR REPEATED PLAYS OF THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA .2. DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
FELDMAN, MW
THOMAS, EAC
[J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1987, 128 (03) : 297 - 315
[6] Fighting for food: a dynamic version of the Hawk-Dove game
Houston, Alasdair I.
McNamara, John M.
[J]. EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY, 1988, 2 (01) : 51 - 64
[7] TOWARDS A UNIFIED FORAGING THEORY
MANGEL, M
CLARK, CW
[J]. ECOLOGY, 1986, 67 (05) : 1127 - 1138
[8] Maynard Smith J., 1982, pi
[9] THE COMMON CURRENCY FOR BEHAVIORAL DECISIONS
MCNAMARA, JM
HOUSTON, AI
[J]. AMERICAN NATURALIST, 1986, 127 (03) : 358 - 378
[10] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
MILINSKI, M
[J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435