RANDOM RESERVATION PRICES AND BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN OCS DRAINAGE AUCTIONS

被引：12

作者：

HENDRICKS, K

PORTER, RH

SPADY, RH

机构：

[1] AT&T BELL LABS,MURRAY HILL,NJ 07974

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467189

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：S83 / S106

页数：24

共 13 条

COSSLETT, SR .

[2]

ENGELBRECHTWIGG.R, 1983, J MATH ECON, V611, P161

[3]

HENDRICKS K, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P865

[4]

HENDRICKS K, 1989, UNPUB ROLE UNINFORME

[5]

KAGEL JH, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P894

[6]

MCAFEE RP, 1987, J ECON LIT, V25, P699

[7] THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN A SEALED-BID AUCTION [J].

MILGROM, P ;

WEBER, RJ .

[8]

Milgrom P. R., 1987, ADV EC THEORY

[9]

Milgrom P.R., 1985, SOCIAL GOALS SOCIAL

[10] DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

MILGROM, PR ;

WEBER, RJ .