REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS DIRECT DEMOCRACY - A TIEBOUT TEST OF RELATIVE PERFORMANCE - COMMENT

被引：5

作者：

DELLER, SC ^{[1
]}

CHICOINE, DL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,INST GOVT & PUBL AFFAIRS,URBANA,IL 61801

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1988年 / 56卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00052071

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：69 / 72

页数：4

共 13 条

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