AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

被引:13
作者
Chen, Tsong Ho [1 ]
机构
[1] Aiber, Assen, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1108/JOPP-08-03-2008-B006
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Award systems play the central role in public procurement, since they determine what is considered by the contracting authority as the most economically advantageous tender.' Many award systems that are used in practice have serious shortcomings, which are caused by the use of relative scores. In this article, the consequences of those shortcomings are demonstrated, using examples from real procurement procedures and case law. The examples are analyzed with methods from econometrics, social choice theory and game theory.
引用
收藏
页码:407 / 430
页数:24
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