MANAGEMENT BONUS PLANS IN A MULTIPLE-AGENT ENVIRONMENT

被引:2
作者
CALLEN, JL [1 ]
机构
[1] MCMASTER UNIV,FAC BUSINESS,HAMILTON L8S 4L8,ONTARIO,CANADA
关键词
D O I
10.1002/mde.4090090207
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 131
页数:5
相关论文
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