INTERRUPTION INSURANCE FOR GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC-POWER

We describe a simple insurance scheme for use in an environment in which consumers of electricity are differentiated by their value of uninterrupted service as well as their location. Location plays a determining role in the model, in that reliability of distribution is allowed to vary throughout the network. Consumers choose a level of compensation for service interruption and pay a premium that depends on this compensation, as well as the distribution reliability at their location. In the event of power shortages, the utility will interrupt consumers according to their selected compensation so as to minimize compensation payments. The premium schedule is designed to induce consumer self-selection which results in efficient rationing, i.e., consumers are interrupted in increasing order of their interruption losses. The tariff has the added feature of inducing consumers to purchase full insurance and thus transfers all of the risk to the utility. It is shown that with proper "tuning" the proposed insurance scheme is Pareto superior to a uniform service charge with random rationing. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.