Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law

被引：68

作者：

Brown, David T. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 1989年 / 2卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/2.1.109

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

When a firm is in financial distress, in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist. This article shows that the bankruptcy code, by providing rules governing the negotiation process, yields a unique solution to the reorganization process. In addition, the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant's divergent incentives.

引用

页码：109 / 123

页数：15

共 24 条

[1] CORPORATE LEVERAGE AND GROWTH - THE GAME-THEORETIC ISSUES [J].