Innovation has frequently been categorized as either radical, incremental, architectural, modular or niche, based on the effects which it has on the competence, other products, and investment decisions of the innovating entity. Often, however, an innovation which is, say, architectural at the innovator/manufacturer level, may turn out to be radical to customers, incremental to suppliers of components and equipment, and something else to suppliers of critical complementary innovations. These various faces of one innovation at different stages of the innovation value-added chain are what we call the hypercube of innovation. For many high-technology products, a technology strategy that neglects these various faces of an innovation and dwells only on the effects of the innovation at the innovator/manufacturer level can have disastrous effects. This is especially so for innovations whose success depends on complementary innovations, whose use involves learning and where positive network externalities exist at the customer level. We describe the hypercube of innovation model and use it to examine RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computers) and CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computers) semiconductor chips, and supercomputers, and suggest how firms can better manage the relationships along the innovation value-added chain using the model. The model forces innovation managers to think in terms of their customers, suppliers and complementary innovators.
